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JOINT COMMITMENT, COERCION AND FREEDOM IN SCIENCE 
Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies 
 
by 
Alban BOUVIER 
Institut Jean Nicod (ENS/ EHESS/ CNRS , Paris) 
 
This paper deals with the Ethics of group life in the sciences, if not directly with 
the policy of science that might evolve from it, and more precisely with the issue of 
democracy within scientific life.
1
  
I uphold a “naturalized” conception of ethics in the moderate sense that I con-
sider a relevant formulation of moral norms (like the duty of respect towards others) 
has to be illuminated by a close analysis of the effective social life (although not re-
duced to it). This viewpoint is compatible with a “naturalized” conception of social 
epistemology, understood as a formulation of the norms of knowledge (like logical 
and empirical validity norms) close to the effective processes of scientific life 
(Goldman, 1999, 2002; Thagard, 1998a, 1998b).
2
 Consequently this ethical and epis-
temological study would like to contribute to the sociology of knowledge in Robert 
Merton’s (1942) style as well, aiming at characterising the “ethos of science”, that is 
not only the effective standards of scientific life but the ideal moral norms of science 
and reciprocally.  
My starting point is the idea that contractualist models are relevant both for the 
analysis of the effective structure of scientific groups, that is at the descriptive level, 
and for providing reasonable normative guides of scientific ethos, but to an extent 
that has to be carefully investigated. My main point is to address the general issue of 
the nature and the degree of freedom that is both ethically desirable and pragmati-
cally accessible within a research team. 
In the first part of this paper, I set forth two very different kinds of situations re-
garding the freedom issue in science, although both can be considered as based on 
“joint commitments”. In the second part, I argue that many situations that seem to be 
based on joint commitments, which implies reciprocal and interdependent commit-
ments, are actually based instead on mere unilateral commitments and that those may 
involve different kinds of ethically illegitimate constraints (or coercion). In the third 
part, I compare the concepts of joint commitment (Margaret Gilbert) and positive lib-
erty (Isaiah Berlin), both inherited from Rousseau’s contractualism. Rejecting posi-
tive liberty as well as negative liberty as unrealistic, I argue for the significance of a 
third conception of liberty as “absence of domination” (Philipp Pettit). I uphold that it 
is a reasonable ideal in scientific life. 
 
                                                 
1
 Regarding the place and the role of science in democratic states, which is another topic, see e.g. Kitcher (2001). 
And for the more general issue of ethical values in science, see e.g. Longino (1990, 2002). 
2
 See also Longino (1990, 2002) on a similar conception of social epistemology and ethics in science. 
2 
I.  
UNCONSTRAINED AND CONSTRAINED JOINT COMMITMENTS  
IN SCIENTIFIC LIFE.  
I first contend that recent contractualist models of groups like Margaret Gilbert’s 
or Philip Pettit’s may be useful for analysing effective scientific groups, therefore at 
the pure descriptive level, whatever normative may be the main concern of each of 
them. Nevertheless I will mainly consider Gilbert’s account in this first part of my 
analysis, since Gilbert has devoted an illuminating paper specifically to scientific 
life.
3
 
Margaret Gilbert has implicitly put forward an alternative to Kuhn’s account of 
paradigms.
4
 For the most part of his account of scientific progress, Kuhn examined 
the transmission of scientific principles during periods of “normal science”, when the 
scientists learn the principles by doing typical exercises and repeating classical ex-
periments within the paradigm at least as much as by explicit teaching. In these situa-
tions, there might be no real space for discussion since discussion requires clear 
awareness of the principles at stake. Kuhn’s account of scientific life fits in with wit-
nesses’ accounts like Heisenberg’s. Thus, according to a recent historian of Quantum 
Mechanics, Mara Beller (1999), Heisenberg conceded in his preface to “his 1930 
book, which he dedicated to the ‘diffusion of the Copenhagen spirit’, that ‘a physicist 
more often has a kind of faith in the correctness of the new principles than a clear un-
derstanding of them’” (p. 39). Actually, to use J. Cohen’s (1992) distinction between 
belief and acceptance as respectively a passive and an active mental process, one can 
argue that within Kuhnian “normal science”, scientists often have “beliefs”, whereas 
in revolutionary periods, when a new paradigm arises, scientists have to choose be-
tween two paradigms and “accept” one of them after having weighed pros and cons. 
Mara Beller’s commentaries on Heisenberg’s confidence makes this distinction par-
ticularly clear, even if Beller does not herself use Cohen’s concepts: “Young physi-
cists, who streamed into these centers [Copenhagen, Göttingen, Leipzig, Hamburg] 
from all over the world, were exposed automatically [= “belief”] to the new philoso-
phy. Because they were more interested in calculating and obtaining definite results 
than in philosophizing, most of them simply adopted [= “belief”] the official interpre-
tation without deep deliberation [= without “acceptance”]” (p. 39) (commentaries be-
tween brackets are mine). Such deliberation would have been necessary, on the con-
trary, if students had been exposed both, on the one hand, to either Bohr (who di-
rected the Copenhagen Institute), Born (who was teaching in Göttingen), Heisenberg 
(who conducted research in Göttingen, then in Copenhagen, then in Leipzig) or Pauli 
(who conducted research in Göttingen, then in Copenhagen, then in Hamburg), and 
on the other hand, to Schrödinger, who developed an alternative conception of Quan-
tum Mechanics in a different place (Berlin).
5
  
                                                 
3
 See Gilbert (2000). 
4
 I have not found any explicit references to Kuhn in Gilbert’s work. 
5
 Kuhn himself insists only on passive aspects (“belief”) of science, even during revolutionary periods, as if the 
change was due to a religious conversion (then from one “belief” to another “belief”). But this account of paradigm 
shift seems psychologically quite implausible, even if some passive processes can play a role, like new perceptual ex-
periences. Besides, it is important to notice that the Copenhagen school is sometimes regarded as the main historical ex-
ample on which Kuhn would have constructed the notion of paradigm (Hanson, 1958, Beller, 1999). 
3 
Gilbert (2000) suggests that new paradigms usually emerge not from the only 
addition of multiple individual acceptances but instead from the “joint acceptances” 
and even “joint commitments” of scientists.6 As is now well known, Gilbert’s main 
goal has been to try to make sense of Durkheim’s intuitions that there are collective 
ideas which can be different from individual ideas and that these collective ideas can 
exert a constraint upon the individuals in the sense that the individuals might not be 
free to not profess them. Gilbert (1989, 2006) suggests that, at least in certain cases, it 
might be comparable to a contractualist situation where certain people vote against a 
law but must nevertheless accept it as their law and obey it if the majority has voted 
in favour of the law. Everybody is “committed” to obey the law and, more exactly, is 
“jointly committed” since each of the voters contracts with each other by voting and 
votes only under the condition that everyone does the same (thus, their commitments 
are interdependent). Gilbert claims that there are many situations in which there is not 
a formal and explicit contract but nevertheless a kind of implicit contract. For exam-
ple, somebody may speak on behalf of the group as a self-proclaimed spokesman in 
such a way that everybody feels jointly committed to this leader and the other mem-
bers of the group just because they did not explicitly disagree when he spoke, even if 
they do not agree deeply (Gilbert, 1994). 
Gilbert did not write much on scientific collective beliefs — or acceptances — 
and, in her 2000 paper, she was essentially interested in the specific issue of the posi-
tive role of outsiders on the growth of knowledge, insofar as group commitments 
around a paradigm can hinder scientific progress. Thus, she was not interested in the 
general relevance of the joint commitment model for investigating the social scien-
tific life. I claim that Gilbert’s extension of the contractualist model to situations 
where there is not an actual contract is especially interesting because it is much more 
realistic (Bouvier, 2008).
7
 In fact, it is rare there be an explicit contract relating to a 
paradigm or a research programme in the sciences. It might be the case when there is 
a public manifesto and the content of the manifesto is voted on by all the members of 
the group that supports it or by a similar formal procedure. But manifestoes are rare 
in the sciences, in particular in the natural sciences, and when there are such things, 
they are rarely the result of a formal procedure.
8
  
As Paul Thagard has noted, “in most scientific fields (…), there is no central so-
cial mechanism that produces a consensus” (Thagard, 1998b). Nevertheless, Thagard 
adds: “In medical research, the need for a consensus is much more acute, since hy-
potheses (…) have direct consequences for the treatment of patients”. Then, Thagard 
refers to the consensus conferences that exist in many countries on health issues. 
Thus, in the US, the National Institute of Health regularly convene such conferences. 
                                                 
6
 Gilbert does not use “acceptance” and “belief” in Cohen’s technical sense and she is even reluctant to this use, 
proposed by Meijers (1999) and Wray (2001). I do not elaborate on this discussion, which does not really matter here. I 
just deem that Cohen’s concepts clarify issues at stake here. 
7
 Nevertheless, one of my goals in this paper is to set forth the case that this model is still not realistic enough. 
8
 An example of an explicit collective manifesto, in the same historical context as the Copenhagen School, is the 
Vienna Circle manifesto, but this dealt with the most general philosophical bases of science rather than with a specific 
research programme in science. Another example is the first chapter of Bourbaki’s Éléments de mathématique, but this 
case is not easy to investigate since the Bourbaki group cultivated so much secrecy about its functionning that even the 
identity of its members was hidden. 
4 
These conferences are constituted by a panel of experts on a specific issue (e.g., given 
the new results in sciences, what is the most recommendable treatment of gastric ul-
cer?). The panels take a decision after a two or three day deliberation. Deliberating is 
justified in these medical contexts because ambiguous data are frequent. Thus, as 
Thagard has reported, many gastric ulcers were sensitive to antibiotics but not all and, 
furthermore, the antibiotic treatment needed a tri-therapy, which was much more 
costly than the previous therapy. Consequently, a consensus conference appeared to 
be quite useful in order to take the right decision on the best remedy for gastric ul-
cers.
 9
  
The situation is comparable in other domains such as economics, because practi-
cal advice is at stake as well. Thus institutes (private institutes), such as the von 
Mises and von Hayek Institutes or the Mont Pélerin Society (all of them founded in 
line with the viewpoints of the Austrian School of Economics, to which I will later on 
go back regarding other aspects), give political recommendations based on a certain 
conception of how economics functions, an issue that remains uncertain. In such 
cases, on which I don’t want to elaborate in detail, one often encounters situations in 
which the members of a minority have to “jointly accept” (with the majority) the 
claims of the majority, although they personally disagree with these claims. Conse-
quently, the minority members will necessarily feel the group as constraining. But 
this constraint is implied by democratic procedures and consequently might be en-
countered in any acceptance of a democratic procedure. 
As Thagard states, in most fields the practical implications are not so evident, so 
that the situation is quite different. However, in this field as in others fields, one can 
encounter implicit contract situations. There may be sorts of informal deliberation be-
tween the members of a group, for example on the general principles of a research 
programme. But, in these latter cases, even if one considers that, in principle, con-
tracts require from each participant a clear awareness both of what is contracted and 
of the existence itself of a contract,
10
 in fact situations are often so ambiguous that it 
may turn out that certain individuals happen to be committed against their deepest 
will, then more or less forced to commit.
11
 I will take here two historical examples to 
set forth the plausibility of these situations in sciences and to more clearly distinguish 
between the two kinds of constraints or coercions (one relative to any joint commit-
ment procedure and one not). Certain differences may seem psychologically or socio-
logically very minor but I claim that they make sense ethically. 
 
First, when Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss (1903) founded a new sociology 
of knowledge research programme in a memoir they signed together (the sociology of 
the fundamental categories of thought programme), although they did not really set 
forth their aims in a manifesto, their joint memoir nevertheless sounded like a mani-
                                                 
9
 Unlike Thagard, Beatty (2006) explicitly uses Gilbert’s concept of “joint acceptance” to account for similar 
collective medical recommendations (in this case, regarding the appreciation of genetics hazards of radiation exposure). 
Referring to Gutman and Thompson (2004), Beatty also tackles the issue of deliberation as a relevant decision-making 
procedure in such cases.  
10
 Gilbert would say that this is a common knowledge context. 
11
 Even explicit contracts may be more or less constrained, e.g. when participants in a discussion do not dare to 
oppose a leader. But it is still more likely when the contract is implicit. 
5 
festo. Besides, no politically oriented academic society or institute was founded on 
their theoretical ideas (unlike what happened in the Austrian School case), but never-
theless they appear to have been explicitly committed, as in a contract, with regards 
to this programme. Thus, they constituted a “group” or, as Gilbert says, a “plural sub-
ject”.  Furthermore they very probably also discussed at length about the content of 
this programme, although one does not have any direct evidence (e.g. via letters) of 
that. They very probably deliberated on the relevance of referring to such or such 
theoretical principle and promoting such or such scientific goal, in the sense that de-
liberation is an exchange of arguments leading to a decision. Consequently, the pro-
gramme was coherent, which means in particular that it did not look like a mere jux-
taposition of two more or less different programmes, as happens in a syncretic syn-
thesis obtained as a result of a mere negotiation.
12
 
In this case, if either Durkheim or Mauss might have felt constrained by the re-
sult of the common deliberation (to some extent possibly different from their deep 
thoughts), and even if Mauss, as a junior, was more susceptible to have renounced 
personal ideas than Durkheim as a senior,
 13
 at least one does not have any evidence 
that Mauss was compelled to “jointly commit” to any common programme with 
Durkheim.  
Finally, this programme was meant to give orientations to a team of colleagues 
and younger researchers like Hubert, Hertz, Czarnowki and so on. These individuals 
did not participate in the writing of the programme, and neither explicitly added their 
name to the “manifesto”. But, they joined the first two, mainly through participating 
regularly in the writing and editing of L’Année Sociologique. Thus, with them they 
were also (almost explicitly) jointly committed to this programme.
14
 But there is no 
evidence either that they had been more or less forced to commit either to this spe-
cific programme or to any collective programme.  
Thus, the Paris French School is a particularly clear example of a group of sci-
entists who intellectually seem to have been jointly committed, in the contractualist 
sense of this expression, either in an explicit (Durkheim and Mauss signing a joint 
memoir) or in a quasi-explicit way (the other members participating in the journal of 
the French School, l’Année sociologique). A particularly striking feature of this group 
behaviour is that they happened to say “we” when they expressed ideas of the joint 
programme, even in personal papers. In these contexts, they publicly meant that they 
felt committed with the other members of the group even while expressing their own 
ideas and that they felt also intitled to involve the other members in their writings, to 
some extent at least, given that these members were supposed to be reciprocally and 
interdependently committed to the same common research programme. Marcel 
Mauss, in a lecture given as the 1938 Huxley Memorial Lecture, wrote: “Vous verrez 
un échantillon − peut-être inférieur à ce que vous attendez − des travaux de l’école 
                                                 
12
 About the difference between deliberation and negotiation (or “bargaining”), see Elster (1991). 
13
 In fact, all the witnesses state that, while Durkheim always exerted enormous and almost totalitarian pressure 
upon Mauss (who was his nephew) to work more and more for the Année Sociologique, to the detriment of Mauss’s pri-
vate life, that was only (or at least mainly) institutional pressure or “coercion” (Besnard, 1979).  
14
 Gilbert (1996, 2006) shows convincingly how someone can jointly commit with other people who have previ-
ously jointly committed together. 
6 
française de sociologie”.15 And he added : “Nous nous sommes attachés tout spécia-
lement à l’histoire sociale des catégories de l’esprit humain” (Mauss, 1950, p. 334).16 
In this context, “we” is not a conventional way to say “I” but clearly refers to the 
whole “French school of sociology”, as the context shows. In the same paper, Mauss 
summarized the contributions of Hubert, Czarnowki, Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl to 
the joint enterprise. 
 
I borrow the second example again from the history of the Copenhagen group in 
Quantum Mechanics, but I now focus on the famous 1927 lecture Niels Bohr gave in 
Como, Italy at the International Volta Congress, in which he put forward the “com-
plementary principle.” Speaking about the same period we have referred to above, 
Heisenberg wrote that there was a kind of specific “spirit” in Copenhagen in these 
late twenties. Beller adds that in the early thirties it was the case as well not only at 
Copenhagen but as well at Göttingen, and still slighty later on at Leipzig and Ham-
burg, where respectively Heisenberg and Pauli had been given professorships. At this 
time, this “spirit” appears to have been just a “passive” belief. But, it was not yet the 
case in September 1927, in Como (at the Volta Congress) or in Brussels in October of 
the same year (at the Solvay Congress), that is at the very beginning of the so-called 
“Copenhagen school”.  
According to Mara Beller, at Como, Bohr did not want only to express his ideas 
but also the ideas of the Copenhagen group. This group was constituted of physicists 
working together in Copenhagen in the same Institute or regularly meeting there, 
mainly Heisenberg, Pauli and Dirac. Bohr’s talk also involved other physicists  
closely connected to the others, such as Max Born (Heisenberg and Pauli had been 
his assistants in Göttingen) or Jordan (another of Max Born’s assistants). Bohr even 
wanted to reconcile the stance of his team with Schrödinger’s, someone who was to 
some extent an intellectual enemy. Thus, it resembled a collective manifesto, with 
somebody speaking on behalf of the group. However, Bohr was not formally dele-
gated by the group to take on this role, and the group members did not write the text 
together (as Durkheim and Mauss) or deliberate on the different issues at stake (e.g. 
on the meaning of “complementarity” or on Niels Bohr’s attempt to reconcile Quan-
tum Mechanics and classical physics). But, as neither Heisenberg nor Pauli explicitly 
and publicly disagreed with Niels Bohr’s lecture either at Como or in further papers, 
the complementary principle was perceived by the entire community as the Copenha-
gen School interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
17
 However, one knows explicitly 
from the correspondence of these authors and implicitly from their articles that actu-
ally some of them, especially Heisenberg, did not accept the complementary principle 
at all (Beller, 1999, Howard, 2004). Moreover, none of the junior scientists explicitly 
jointly committed to Bohr’s programme by participating in a specific review (like the 
members of Durkheim’s group) or a handbook. Thus, in this situation it appears that, 
unlike the young members of the French School of Sociology vis-à-vis Durkheim, 
                                                 
15
 “You will see a sample –maybe not as good as what you might have expected – of works of the French School 
of Sociology”.  
16
  “In particular we have tackled the social history of categories of the human mind” 
17
 Dirac could not come to Como (nor Schrödinger).  
7 
Heisenberg and Pauli  were forced — to some extent — to jointly commit to Bohr 
and to assume a collective paradigm (of which they did not personally accept certain 
ideas).
18
  
Nevertheless, from Gilbert’s point of view  as we will soon see in more detail, 
this makes no real significant difference with the French School example since the 
public silence of the Copenhagen group members was to be interpreted as a joint 
agreement by every participant in the Congress, so that the Copenhagen group mem-
bers were jointly committed exactly in the same sense as the Paris group members 
According to me, on the contrary, the point here is that, if the intellectual joint com-
mitment itself (whatever its specific content may be) was obtained only thanks to a 
kind of coercion, this commitment raises specific problems. 
Actually, one could argue that the involvement of the other Copenhagen and 
Göttingen physicists was not yet as clear as it was in the Paris group case. Thus, in 
his Como talk and in the different written versions that were published from this, 
Niels Bohr never used “we” (unlike Mauss, for example), as he could have done if he 
wanted to very clearly implicate the Copenhagen-Göttingen group as such.
19
 How-
ever, one month later, at the end of the Solvay Congress, Heisenberg and Max Born 
gave a joint lecture, in which they pronounced this famous statement: “We regard 
quantum mechanics as a complete theory for which the fundamental physical and 
mathematical hypotheses are no longer susceptible of modification.” (Heisenberg W. 
and M. Born, 1927, p. 437).
20
 In the context, it was clear that “we” did not refer only 
to Heisenberg and Born but instead to the whole Copenhagen-Göttingen group. And 
as Bohr did not explicitly disagree with the content of this paper, the usual feeling 
was again that all the Copenhagen-Göttingen physicists shared the same conception 
of Quantum Mechanics.
21
 At Solvay, it is Heisenberg and Born who were the auto-
proclaimed spokesmen and who more or less forced the others members of the Co-
penhagen-Göttingen group (ironically including Bohr himself) to accept their own 
common view. Then, all the scientists were publicly jointly committed to a common 
conception like in Como, although not exactly to the same conception as in Como, 
since they did not explicitly disagree.
22
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 See also Bouvier, (2004 and 2007a).The case of Pauli is particular because Pauli participated very much in the 
re-writing of Bohr’s paper between the Como talk and the various further publications, but not to the point of becoming 
a joint author with Bohr (like Durkheim and Mauss). The different  versions of this paper were only signed by Bohr. 
19
 My account of the Bohr’s Como lecture is based on the 1931 version, a revised version of the paper published 
in Nature in 1928, and the version to which scholars usually refer. The original oral version was not completely written 
down;  consequently it is not available (Mehra J. and H. Rechenberg, 1982). 
20
 I thank Orly Shenker for this reference. 
21
 The main discussions at the 1927 Solvay Congress were held between Bohr and Einstein (who was very reluc-
tant about Bohr’s ideas on ontological indeterminism). Pauli participated very much in the discussion as well but there 
was no space for an internal discussion (or deliberation) within the Copenhagen group or within the slightly broader 
Copenhagen-Göttingen group . See Mehra J. and H. Rechenberg, (1982) for further details. 
22
 Howard (2004) contends that what is now called the “Copenhagen interpretation” is actually very close to 
Heisenberg’s conceptions (namely the subjective interpretation of quantum phenomena, focusing on the observer’s role) 
and that it is a very regrettable mistake to attribute this conception to Bohr. Howard adds that Heisenberg presented 
himself explicitly as a spokesman of the whole Copenhagen group mainly from the fifties onwards (and that he might 
have specific personal interests in giving the impression that there was a unified interpretation shared by everyone in the 
Copenhagen group, and that he was really a member of this group, given that his very ambiguous behaviour during the 
Second World War regarding the Nazi nuclear programme had almost caused him to be banished from this group). The 
quotation drawn from Heisenberg and Born’s report at Solvay reveals that it was already the case in 1927. 
8 
What can be considered as a consequence of the Como coerced joint commit-
ment and of the related absence of deliberation between the group members is that 
the Como talk is notoriously obscure.
23
Admittedly there are several interpretations of 
this obscurity. The most classical one is that Bohr’s ideas were not yet clear enough 
when he wrote this paper and that he gave the audience his still emerging thought 
both on the relevant interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and on the unification of 
contemporary theoretical physics.
24
 But Mara Beller’s recent interpretation is that 
Bohr tried to amalgamate his ideas with Heisenberg’s, Dirac’s, and Pauli’s. Since 
their ideas were incompatible on certain fundamental points (which was not the case, 
e.g. in the Durkheim-Mauss memoir on the sociology of categories), Niels Bohr’s 
amalgamating could not be but an incoherent syncretic synthesis. 
 
To conclude the first part of this investigation, I will just state again that there is 
a pretty clear opposition between a freely agreed joint commitment (within the Paris 
school of sociology) and a forced joint commitment (within the Copenhagen school 
of Quantum Mechanics). Although from Gilbert’s viewpoint this does not make a 
relevant difference, one can argue that many scientists would not find Niels Bohr’s 
attitude at Como (as described above, following Beller’s interpretation) or Werner 
Heisenberg’s and Max Born’s at Solvay quite fair in comparison with Emile Durk-
heim’s relation to Marcel Mauss and the members of the Paris group. I share this 
feeling and, in the second part of this paper, I would like to focus on the ethical di-
mension of Gilbert’s conception of joint commitment a little more directly . 
 
II.  
JOINT COMMITMENT, UNILATERAL COMMITMENT  
AND ILLEGITIMATE CONSTRAINTS  
 
To my knowledge Gilbert has not elaborated at length on the previous normative 
problem (either in scientific life or elsewhere) and when she has addressed it, it was 
in relation with a closely related although different problem. It deals with Hobbes’ 
and Rousseau’s conceptions of social contract. In fact, provoking Rousseau’s indig-
nation, Hobbes’ viewpoint left the door open to an ethical justification of domination 
and slavery _ as far as this relation is “jointly accepted” (and that each contractant, ei-
ther master or slave, feels “jointly committed”).25 
Commenting Hobbes’s conception of social contract, David Schmidtz (1990), 
whom Margaret Gilbert (1993) quoted, wrote : “I think it is more charitable to 
Hobbes to read his discussion as a purely descriptive account of the possible ways in 
which sovereigns can actually emerge, with no normative implications intended” 
(Gilbert, 1993, p. 310, n. 44). But, responding to Schmidtz, Gilbert added after 
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  Similarly, one can argue that a consequence of the Solvay forced joint commitment is that sometimes Heisen-
berg’s specific ideas (for example the subjectivist interpretation of Quantum Mechanics) are attributed to Bohr, cf. the 
previous footnote. 
24
 Nevetherless most scholars think that the obscurity of this principle still grew as Bohr broadened its signifi-
cance in his later publications. 
25
 See, e.g., Rousseau (1964) Livre I, chap. IV « De l’esclavage ». 
9 
Schmidtz’ quotation: “My dispute is with ‘no normative implications’. No moral im-
plications of a certain sort, perhaps. But (…) any genuine agreement has its own 
normative weight − as the conquering sovereign may well discern” (p. 310, n. 44). 26 I 
agree with Gilbert on the fact that there is still a normative constraint or, more ex-
actly, that people may feel committed (or may feel the “normative weight” of the 
agreement), even when there is constraint or coercion on the commitment itself, that 
is when participants have been to some extent compelled to jointly commit. And I 
find her viewpoint particularly astute and right sociologically speaking.
27
 But, regard-
ing the moral issue, I find Gilbert much too ambiguous. In fact, she seems to only 
concede that the commitment might not have moral legitimacy (“perhaps”) and even 
to suggest that the same commitment might nevertheless have certain moral legiti-
macy, although of another sort than those Schmidtz seems ready accept (“no moral 
implications of a certain sort”). According to me, Gilbert’s response remains much 
closer to Hobbes’s ambiguous viewpoint than to Rousseau’s intuitions, which I con-
sider (probably like many other people) as the genuine moral intuitions. I will try to 
make this point more explicit regarding the scientific life case. Again, historical ex-
amples can help us to understand what is really at stake in these contexts.  
Actually, to be perfectly clear, one has to carefully distinguish between two 
kinds of constraining situations. What might be revolting is a situation where the par-
ticipants in a joint commitment are more or less forced to jointly commit, as at Como, 
that is a specific contractualist procedure. This was the matter in the first part of this 
paper. But it might be also the content of the contract, especially when this contract 
implies entirely imposed constraints (slavery is an extreme case), something Philip 
Pettit calls “domination”. This is the matter of Hobbes-Rousseau controversy. Not 
surprisingly, the two constraints might find themselves entangled in historical cases. 
But a careful investigation suggests that joint commitment, therefore reciprocal 
and interdependent commitments, may be less frequent in sciences than Margaret 
Gilbert seems to believe (and that Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment may lead 
one to think), whereas unilateral commitments may be much more frequent. Scien-
tific groups are generally constituted of junior and senior researchers, so that it is 
likely that the commitment of each member with regards to a set of principles will not 
be reciprocal and interdependent: the senior will more likely expect a commitment 
from the junior to a set of principles without feeling committed with him to this set of 
principles.
28
 As some examples will illustrate, the expectation of such commitment 
might be very constraining. Consequently, the examination of ethically illegitimate 
commitments deserves to be extended to these unilateral commitments. One will ob-
serve constraints both on the commitment content and on the commitment procedure 
(which this time means constraint to unilaterally commit). I will in succession inves-
tigate two different examples illustrating the two different situations. To facilitate 
comparisons, I chose these examples in scientific communities that I have already 
considered. 
                                                 
26
 Gilbert also discusses Simmons (1979) and Simmons (1984). See also Gilbert (2006). 
27
 Gilbert’s analysis fits in with Weber’s analysis of legitimation, which permits us to understand how (even au-
thoritarian) political powers can stand up without necessarily using force or even threatening to use force. 
28
 The case of Durkheim, as described above, might be an exception. 
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Let us first refer to the relations Bohr had years later after the Como conference 
with his students or young researchers. Beller insists on the fact that Bohr was now 
considered as a “hero” and was surrounded by a true cult to the extent that the young 
researchers did not feel able to think differently from Bohr and tried to interpret his 
most obscure papers as if they expressed the hidden truth of the world. Thus, accord-
ing to Mara Beller, Weizsäcker once noted, after having met Bohr and understood 
hardly anything, “What must I understand to be able to tell what he meant and why 
was he right? I tortured myself on endless solitary walks” (Beller, 1999, p. 275). 
Weizsäcker’s reaction seems to be pretty irrational since Weizsäcker seems a priori to 
eliminate the possibility that Bohr could have been wrong.
29
 Beller comments : “The 
question was not: Was Bohr right? or To what an extent was Bohr right? or On what 
issues was Bohr right? But quite incredibly, What must one assume and in what way 
must one argue in order to render Bohr right?” (Beller, 1999, p. 275). Thus it looks 
like an entire submission to one another’s thought and therefore a complete loss of 
freedom of thought, whether this other scientist was really aware or not of imposing 
his thought.
30
  
Mara Beller adds that certain scientists (possibly including Weizsäcker himself) 
felt guilty for not thinking like Bohr. “Bohr’s unpublished correspondence discloses 
the overwhelming guilt experienced by those physicists who dared to challenge him” 
(Beller, 1999, p. 274). Experiencing guilt means that sorts of commitments were vio-
lated. But the first issue is to know if these were joint commitments between Bohr 
and his students (or junior scientists) or instead only students’ (or junior scientists’) 
unilateral commitments to Bohr’s principles. In the former case, it would have meant 
that these students would have felt committed to the principles only to the extent that 
Bohr’s reciprocally seemed committed to the same principles, which is plausible. But 
the idea of joint commitment also implies that Bohr’s would have felt himself com-
mitted to these principles under the conditions that his students seemed committed as 
well (interdependence), which is quite unlikely. Consequently, although there is no 
absolute evidence of any kind, unilateral commitments only of the students are much 
more likely than (reciprocal and interdependent) joint commitments of everyone. And 
these cases are situations in which Bohr seems to have more or less consciously im-
posed his views. 
 
Bohr’s case is surely an extreme case (characteristic of charismatic leaders) but 
extreme cases of this kind are not rare in the social sciences. I would like to refer to 
another case chosen in a group I have also already referred to, not only because this 
example is less extreme but also because it illustrates another possible aspect of uni-
lateral commitments hidden under apparent joint commitments. It is the case of 
Ludwig von Mises, one of the main representatives of the Austrian School of Eco-
nomics, especially when he emigrated to the U.S.A. during the Second World War 
                                                 
29
 Beller (1999) examines another similar case, Jesse Du Mond’s (p. 274).  
30
 Weizsäcker later tried to unify science and religion. See Weizsäcker (1980). The complementary principle’s 
extensions provided by Bohr himself opened the door to such attempts. 
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(and long before the foundation of the von Mises institutes by his followers). Mises 
was allegedly very authoritative with everybody (Caldwell, 2004). But for years he 
entirely rejected one of his closest and most brilliant students, Fritz Machlup, just be-
cause the latter publicly defended scientific views (more exactly epistemological 
views) different from his. Mises is reported to have been indignant on this occasion.
31
 
This indignation reveals that he thought Machlup was committed to the same theories 
as he himself was.   
Actually, one could argue that if there was a joint commitment to certain theo-
retical principles, e.g. the Austrian principles (methodological individualism, subjec-
tivism, and focus on processes more than on equilibrium states,  Boettke, 1994b) or to 
certain more specific principles characteristic of the von Mises micro-community 
(see below), Mises might have been right to reproach Machlup. But the first point is 
to know whether von Mises really felt jointly committed to these principles with 
Machlup and possibly with other junior scientists. As there is no evidence of such a 
joint commitment feeling (unlike what emerges from the French school of sociology 
materials, for example), it is much more psychologically plausible to think that von 
Mises did not feel himself jointly committed to these principles, although he expected 
that Machlup felt committed to them. On the other hand, according to Fritz 
Machlup’s memories (Machlup, 1981), Machlup seems to have understood he should 
have felt committed to these principles only when Mises heaped reproaches on him.
32
 
Thus, the commitments at stake were at least not “common knowledge” with respect 
to Mises and Machlup, which would have required that the commitments be “out in 
the open” with respect to them (Gilbert, 1996, p. 198).  
But, what is specifically interesting in this case is that the “clash” between von 
Mises and Machlup happened on the significance of von Mises’ specific idea, the 
idea that the rationality principle, taken as the most relevant principle in social sci-
ences by many scientists, was analytical, that is that human action has to be consid-
ered as a priori rational. For Mises, if certain behaviour was not rational, it was not 
specifically human and did not require specific explanation from the social sciences, 
but if it was human, it was rational by definition (Mises, 1966). But as Rizzo (1990) 
has brilliantly shown, what can be discussed — even if one accepts the rationality 
principle as the “core” of a research programme — is the content of the notion of ra-
tionality. And the various meanings this notion can take constitute the “protection 
belt” of the programme, to use Lakatos’s terms. The clash between von Mises and 
Machlup took place when Machlup suggested such a modification of the rationality 
principle’s meaning, in the light of the growing empiricist criticisms against Mises’s 
“a priorism” (Boettke, 1994a). It is surely a case where collective deliberations lead-
ing to decisions as to the relevance of the modification of certain principles of a para-
digm would have made sense. But it was not what happened under von Mises’s 
“reign” since Mises seems not to have been able to accept any modification of the 
supposedly shared principles. 
                                                 
31
 There was also another similar occasion (regarding the right policies to encourage on the gold standard issue), 
in which there was a clash between von Mises and Machlup; see Bouvier (2007b). 
32
 I addressed this specific issue in detail in Bouvier (forthcoming). See also Bouvier (2007b). 
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In this part, I have set forth two kinds of what I consider as illegitimate con-
straints imposed upon members of a scientific community within the context of 
commitments that seem at first sight to be joint commitments but reveal themselves 
to be more plausibly mere unilateral commitments of junior scientists. In one case, 
the constraint is rather on the content of the commitment: Weizsäcker seems to have 
almost abandoned confidence in his own thought, entirely submitting it to Bohr’s. In 
the other, the constraint is rather on the procedure: Machlup was reproached by von 
Mises for either having violated a (unilateral) commitment or not having felt commit-
ted since Machlup wanted to initiate modification of the principles.  
Now, at this point, I find it useful to introduce more astute  moral or ethical con-
ceptions of freedom and liberty than those I have till now implicitly used to investi-
gate more in detail these two kinds of constraints, especially in unilateral commit-
ment contexts (but as well in joint commitments contexts since Como type cases raise 
problems). It will be the matter of the third part of this paper. 
 
III  
SCIENTIFIC LIBERTY AS ABSENCE OF ARBITRARY CONSTRAINT (DOMINATION) 
 
Philip Pettit, who is partly interested in the same problem as Gilbert, notably the 
understanding of Durkheim’s intuitions about the possible existence of groups or the 
relevance of contractualist models (Pettit, 1993, 2003), has elaborated much more on 
this issue than Gilbert (Pettit, 1999). And as Pettit considers “deliberative” situations 
(although not specifically in the scientific life contexts), his conceptions of freedom 
and liberty might help us to refine our ethical intuitions.
33
 I will be led later on to 
consider new historical cases, but in the meanwhile, I need to consider more general 
issues on freedom and liberty. 
 
Pettit takes as his point of departure Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) famous distinction 
between two kinds of liberty, positive and negative and wants to introduce a third 
one. Pettit also introduces a new kind of Republicanism, based on this new kind of 
liberty, different from the classical Rousseauan tradition that arguably continues with 
Habermas and enhances positive liberty. Positive liberty is the freedom to decide po-
litically for oneself, that is to be politically autonomous. Rousseau’s conception of 
contractualism is of this kind: citizens obey laws that they have decided on without 
delegates or any other intermediaries. Habermas’s conception of deliberative democ-
racy (Habermas, 1992), just adds to Rousseau’s conception the fundamental idea that 
what really makes the general will a value is the fact that it is obtained through delib-
eration, that is through an exchange of arguments leading to a decision. If one accepts 
the idea that there may be deliberation in science, the construction of Durkheim and 
Mauss’s programme of the sociology of categories seems close to this conception,  
because Durkheim and Mauss seem to have been jointly committed together (there-
                                                 
33
 To my knowledge, Thagard, one of the leading figure of naturalized social epistemology has not addressed the 
ethical aspect of cooperation or collaboration in science. See Thagard (1997). 
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fore reciprocally and interdependently) without feeling any specific intellectual con-
straint from the other, as far as one can have a plausible knowledge of this kind of 
feeling on the basis of their confidences and of their general behaviour. And there is 
no evidence either that this was different regarding the other members.  
But this Rousseau-Habermas normative conception of democracy seems pretty 
unrealistic for many reasons, of which the Como case is a good illustration. Thus, the 
Como case suggests that deliberation may be entirely lacking in joint commitment 
contexts and that the joint commitment may be coerced too. Moreover, as the rela-
tions between Bohr and his students in the last stages of the Copenhagen school or 
between von Mises and Machlup suggest, the joint commitment may be more appar-
ent than real, so that what the junior scientist may have to face is actually a unilateral 
commitment associated with a constraint either to entirely submit to senior’s thought 
or not to be allowed to participate in the modification of the shared principles. 
The Rousseau-Habermas conception of democracy is still unrealistic for other 
reasons. Thus, as is well known, Berlin also rejects this conception of liberty, which 
he calls positive liberty, as all the liberals since Benjamin Constant and Tocqueville, 
mainly because, according to them, it is the door open to the tyranny of the majority 
upon the minority.
34
 These risks exist as well in the sciences and, for example, a ma-
jority may make remedy recommendations in medicine or a specific policy in eco-
nomics even if the minority strongly disagrees. I will not elaborate more on these 
cases. 
But given that all these reasons are more or less clearly accessible to everyone, it 
might not be surprising that when a new paradigm arises, scientists often do not 
jointly − nor unilaterally (if they can) − commit together, contrarily to what Gilbert’s 
model suggests. I will take here two examples, again chosen within the history of the 
research programmes I have already examined. In these two cases, while the scien-
tists shared some fundamental ideas, they did not jointly commit and neither did they 
construct a collective research programme in Gilbert’s sense of “collective”. In these 
two cases, the collective beliefs or — rather — the collective acceptances were a mat-
ter of a “summative account” to use Gilbert’s language. Besides, no scientists either 
unilaterally commit to one another. The issue will be, of course, to know whether this 
kind of “natural state” is both desirable and often realizable in science. 
 
The first example is the case of the early Copenhagen School, during the few 
years before the Como conference and the Solvay Congress (which took place both in 
1927). According to Mara Beller, and it is a point on which she insists a lot given the 
historical data at our disposal, although Bohr — not only the oldest of the group but 
the most famous as well at this period — Heisenberg, Pauli and Dirac shared certain 
if not very numerous conceptions on quantum mechanics, they did not commit to any 
collective programme (which does not necessarily exclude external institutional pres-
                                                 
34
 Obviously, this tyranny is especially hard to support when the minority sincerely thinks that the majority is 
gravely mistaken. 
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sure).
35
 In Berlin’s and Pettit’s terms, they experienced intellectual negative liberty, 
that is the independence from any intellectual constraint (even from Niels Bohr), such 
as in a natural state (in the sense of Hobbes or Rousseau).  
The comparison will be perhaps more tangible if I take the Austrian School of 
Economics also in its earlier period, that is the period of Carl Menger, von Wieser 
and Böhm-Bawerk (of which von Mises was the most brilliant student). Like Bohr, 
Heisenberg, Pauli, Jordan and so on, they were not at all jointly committed to any 
collective programme although Menger, von Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk shared sig-
nificant conceptions, particularly methodological individualism, subjectivism, focus 
on processes instead of equilibriums and also what is called the “marginalist” concep-
tion of value (Boettke, 1994a). Like Bohr in the early Copenhagen School, Carl 
Menger was older than his colleagues and much better-known. Nevertheless Menger, 
Böhm-Bawerk, von Wiese remained independent of each other and Menger did not 
constrain at all their own projects (nor impose unilateral commitments).
36
 So, they 
experienced negative liberty in Berlin’s sense or freedom as absence of interference 
in Pettit’s sense, that is absence of any (intellectual or institutional) constraint (Boet-
tke, 1994a).  
 
Finally, Philip Pettit has introduced a third conception of freedom and liberty 
and has described a historical tradition that emphasises this conception, that is neither 
positive liberty in Rousseau’s contractualist sense nor negative liberty or liberty as 
independence or absence of interference (and consequently any constraint) from oth-
ers in one’s project. This tradition, Pettit states, is closer to Cato’s Letters or to the 
Federalist Papers. The key idea is that liberty is essentially the absence of domina-
tion, that is absence of arbitrary constraint in a sense I will specify. This idea is di-
rectly opposed to the Hobbesian indifference to coercitive commitments in both 
senses of coercion (coercion on the procedure and on the content of the commitment). 
It requires less than autonomy, that is less than joint commitment and therefore less 
than reciprocal and interdependent commitments. On the other hand, it does not en-
tirely exclude constraint as far as this constraint is not arbitrary (what Pettit calls in-
terference), which means that unilateral as well as joint commitment are not prohib-
ited, if the required commitment does not mean loss of intellectual freedom (what one 
can call the content condition) and if the commitment is not constrained itself (what 
can be called the procedural condition). 
Where is the place of liberty in this conception of democracy? As in politics 
Pettit states that liberty is not fundamentally located in the procedures of decision 
concerning the laws, in a scientific context this is not fundamentally located in the 
formulation of the goals of the research programmes themselves, which can be for-
mulated by an intellectual leader. But this liberty is situated in the capability at least 
to publicly contest the attempts, in politics, of the Government — and, in a scientific 
context, those of the intellectual leader — to impose his view on the members of his 
                                                 
35
 Bohr tried to persuade Heisenberg in 1927, before the Como conference, not to publish his Uncertainty paper, 
as early as Heisenberg wanted. Heisenberg stated that “perhaps it was also a struggle about who did the whole thing 
first” (Beller, 1999, p. 138-9). 
36
 Unlike Heisenberg and Pauli, they already had a position as full professors. 
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team (e.g., see both the Heisenberg and Pauli case at Como, in a joint commitment 
context and the Weiszäcker case later, in a unilateral context).  
One can furthermore argue, as James Bohman (2005) did following Hannah Ar-
endt’s intuitions, that this kind of conception is nevertheless slightly too weak and 
that the democratic minimum requires the right and the capability of initiating modi-
fications (in Law, in a collective research programme _ see the Machlup case). I 
share Pettit’s proposal and Bohman’s amendment.37 
 
Conclusion  
 
To conclude, I will state the following propositions. First, the earliest periods 
both of the Copenhagen school in quantum mechanics and of the Austrian school in 
economics are evidently characteristic of a scientific revolution, in which one can ex-
perience negative liberty. For this reason, these periods cannot probably be taken as 
references for further scientific development, which require collective planned re-
search. Second, the French school of sociology case seems a very rare case in which 
members seem to have experienced positive liberty, other cases of joint commitment 
or apparent joint commitment actually either leading to more or less moderate ille-
gitimate intellectual coercion, as in the case of Bohr at Como, or hiding unilateral 
commitments leading to more severe cases of intellectual coercion, such as in the 
cases of the elder Bohr vis-à-vis Weizsäcker (and other junior scientists) and von 
Mises vis-à-vis Machlup. 
The third model of liberty (absence of domination) seems more realistic in sci-
ence. On the one hand, it does not require a complete absence of intellectual con-
straint (a certain degree of intellectual constraint might be useful for the scientific 
progress internal to a paradigm, that is when science becomes “normal science” in 
Kuhn’s sense). It does not require joint commitment either: reciprocity and interde-
pendence of commitments might be too demanding when there is an inequality of 
competence in a domain. But, on the other hand, this model of liberty nevertheless 
requires the right and the capability to publicly contest, which Heisenberg and Pauli 
in Como and Weizsäcker later on were lacking, and the right and the capability to ini-
tiate modifications in a research programme, which was missing for Machlup.  
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